THE New Republic

**THE DEMOCRATS ALSO LIKE IKE**
**by Robert L. Riggs**

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**MAY 30, 1955**

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MAY 27 1955

# Washington Wire .... *T.R.B.*

**You won't believe** it, but some Democrats are actually trying to inject "politics" into the Salk vaccine discussion. Fortunately the one-party GOP press is knocking such efforts on the head wherever they appear. How anyone can attack a business-minded Administration under a man like Eisenhower and a woman like Oveta Culp Hobby at a moment like this is beyond us. Don't they realize the health of America's little children transcends "partisanship?" And yet this is just what Senate GOP Leader Knowland protests some people are injecting into the Washington 40-day delay.

Thank heaven we have leaders like Ike and Hobby! As the President glowingly said last week, "I think she [Hobby] has done a mighty magnificent job." (He added later that she might resign soon.) Mrs. Hobby, you remember, is the author of that widely quoted comment that "nobody could have foreseen" the demand for vaccine.

Actually, we suspect a political motive in the way some papers are keeping the polio story on page one. Not by the owners and managers, you understand, but by some of these reporters and make-up men and editors who are, we learn, no better than they should be. The *New York Times* last week "led the paper" three times with Salk, carried 15 front page stories in the seven days, and even told readers one day (on page 30) about the way our left-wing neighbor Canada is distributing vaccine. This, we regret to say, is under government subsidy. All the Canadian kids are getting the vaccine, quickly and cheaply. Nice for the kids, of course, and their parents—but it's being done outside the free enterprise system. Surely we'd risk a few twisted tots and paralyzed bodies here and there over the nation to block that sort of thing in the United States. As for the partisan attempt by a few warped souls to criticize Mrs. Hobby, we know we can count on our free American press to stop *that*.

**This column** hasn't much to add to the current discussion of world developments, which are humming. A reluctant President has agreed to go to a Big Four meeting. A jolly, stage-managed, White House TV show last week gave Dulles a chance to tell what a great victory we have scored over the Soviets while Ike clucked approval. Personally, we suspect this is only a half-truth. We guess that Moscow has discovered it can't stop Europe's recovery and our rearming, and so now it is off on another slant. It is trying to cash in on the world's desire to stay out of atomic wars by making a play for neutralism. This is a much more complex gambit to counter than the mere building of tanks and airplanes. We hope our team has the mental flexibility to meet it.

**Last week** the GOP gave the first delicate turn of the screw to Ike to make certain that he runs again. They began to remind him of "duty." Most leaders still can't take his resistance seriously, but here and there some do exhibit concern. So two pressures are being devised, a state-by-state "grass-roots" demand, which should be fruitful and, if that doesn't work, the gradual application of that terrible thumbscrew "duty." We doubt if even Ike yet realizes the extent to which GOP moguls are prepared to go. We're going to hear a good deal more about "duty" before the show is over.

**We have been** looking over the copy of a document sent to Congress March 3, 1931, a veto message by President Hoover. In it he rejected government acquisition of Muscle Shoals. We got absorbed in running through the brittle clippings of that day. Now the Chairman of the Hoover Commission has assembled another task force of bankers and businessmen whose confidential report to him on "federal water resources" has leaked out. They drop a blockbuster on TVA and recommend that its power facilities be sold back to private corporations. Whether the other 11 members of the parent Hoover panel will go along with this recommendation of a group Hoover appointed we don't know. We bet H. H. will.

Why did Tennessee want TVA in 1931? asked Hoover petulantly in his veto. "This territory," he said, "is now supplied with power." In that happy, far-off day 3 percent of the area farms were electrified; now it is 90 percent. (Another report of the Hoover Commission recently attacked the Rural Electrification Administration, under which much of the progress was achieved.) "Any estimate of the income of this project [TVA] as set up by this legislation will show a loss," Hoover wrote in his 1931 veto. "It can be stated with assurance that no chemical industry . . . can be successfully conducted by the government." Then came the ringing words, "I hesitate to contemplate the future of our institutions, of our government, and of our country if the preoccupation of its officials is to be no longer the promotion of justice and equal opportunity but is to be devoted to barter in the markets. That is not liberalism, it is degeneration." Good old George Akerson; what a style he and French Strother worked up for the President, to be sure!

**We might say** something mean here—about how Hoover, the "liberal," signed the Smoot-Hawley, iron-curtain tariff that helped promote Hitler. But we find it terribly hard to criticize Hoover. He inspires the same feeling of awe and affection that you feel toward your great Aunt Zeleika's overstuffed horsehair sofa. There are reports that he is embarrassing the White House. Well, we hope not. Hoover is voicing what a lot of right-wing Republicans undoubtedly feel in their hearts, but we trust that Ike's lieutenants haven't lost complete hold of political realities.

**Notes:** Harry Cain, whose switch to liberalism on civil liberties stunned the Capital, may run against liberal Sen. Warren Magnuson (D, Wash.) next year. . . . Rep. Henry Reuss (D, Wis.) will probably run against McCarthy in '58; Reuss (43), lawyer, lecturer and magazine writer, is making a national name for himself. . . . Detroit is producing cars so fast it's hard to see what will happen if the auto industry doesn't get a strike; it might have to cut prices. . . . General Motors and Ford might like a strike if Reuther would only shut them both down; the trouble is he will probably interrupt only one, in which case neither wants to be that one.

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# BEHIND THE HEADLINES

## Chou En-lai: "It Was a Famous Victory"

CHOU EN-LAI, Premier of Communist China, is among the most persuasive and powerful of Asian leaders. The extent of his persuasiveness and the limits of his power are revealed by his report of May 13 to the Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress on his role at the Afro-Asian conference at Bandung.

In closed-door sessions at Bandung, delegates now report, Chou and his aides fought tenaciously to commit the conference to Communist views. In general they lost. Chou then signed the conference communique which is at variance with Communist doctrine on many significant points. In doing so he left himself open to attack. No lesser figure than Chou could have compromised Marxist principles with impunity. And even Chou, in a series of ingenious and contradictory arguments, seems anxious to establish his defenses against those who can argue that both as a Communist agitator and as a Chinese spokesman he failed.

The Asian and African nations, Chou holds, are driven by historical reasons and present needs to co-operate with Communist China. So, despite their contrasting ideologies they are fit objects for "co-operation." These contrasting ideologies, however, did threaten disputes at Bandung. For the sake of "co-operation," therefore, it was necessary at times to give in. However, Chou blames his failure to press harder for Communist doctrines upon the imperialist West. The imperialists, Chou maintains, disliked the Bandung conference and wanted it to fail. "We could not make the conference a failure in conformity with the desires of such people," Chou adds. "Therefore we adopted the attitude of striving for unity and avoiding quarrels."

The Bandung Communique went far beyond Chou's "five principles" in pledging the signatories to respect for fundamental human rights and for the UN Charter, to refrain from interference in the affairs of other countries and to oppose the settlement of disputes by force. "All these," Chou now explains, "are principles which China has consistently observed." But one of the Bandung principles endorses the right of Asian nations to participate in collective defense systems as long as these do not "serve the particular interests of any of the big powers." The purpose of this provision was to sanction Turkish participation in NATO and Philippine and Thai participation in SEATO. Chou maintains, however, that the provision is "actually a denunciation of this kind of aggressive military bloc."

The Bandung Conference Communique further called for economic co-operation with the West. Chou sidesteps this travesty against the Peking Line, affirming merely that, "Such economic intercourse can only worsen the stagnation and impoverishment of the backward countries and is no aid at all in the true sense of the word."

A harder task for Chou is to explain away the Bandung resolution condemning colonialism in "all its manifestations." For these were specifically intended to include domination by foreign Communist regimes. Chou's reasoning is ingenious. "Colonialism," he defines as "a product of capitalism." . . . So, glossing over the fact that his is not the definition accepted at Bandung, Chou proves that the conference could not have had Communist colonialism in mind. However, Chou does concede that, "Certain people strangely distorted colonialism." These people, Chou continues, "went to the length of using the term so-called colonialism in all its forms in order to slander socialism as another form of colonialism." Chou does not elaborate upon the difference between "all forms" and "all manifestations." He concludes simply: "The phrase 'in all its manifestations' denotes colonialism in its political, military, cultural and social manifestations and there cannot possibly be any other interpretation."

In one brief sentence Chou notes, "We put forward no proposals either against the occupation of Taiwan by the United States . . . or for the restoration to the People's Republic of China of her legitimate status in the United Nations."

A final contradiction is presented by Red China's Premier in defining his country's attitude to the UN. It is: full loyalty to the UN Charter (which he alone can interpret), no loyalty whatever to the UN Assembly, which the charter creates and empowers to act. His justification is that the Assembly happens to be dominated by the US. "The Chinese people," declares Chou, "consistently support the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. . . . We undertake no obligation toward the resolutions of the United Nations. We are always firmly opposed to these UN resolutions which go against the UN Charter and are totally unjust."




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## A Revival of Republican Independence

W. THACHER LONGSTRETH, the 34-year-old advertising executive who will be the Republican candidate for mayor of Philadelphia next fall, promises to give Democrat Richardson Dilworth a hard fight for the city's pivotal independent vote. It is the first time in a generation that the Republicans have come up with a non-machine candidate in Philadelphia —a reformation that can be attributed to Democratic successes in recent years.

Philadelphia's swing to the Democrats began in 1951, when two reformers, Joseph S. Clark Jr. and Richardson Dilworth, successfully invaded City Hall—an Old Guard Republican stronghold for 67 years. Clark became mayor and Dilworth became district attorney. While Eisenhower was sweeping Pennsylvania in 1952, Philadelphia was giving Stevenson a 160,000-vote plurality. In 1954, George Leader upset all predictions and became Pennsylvania's first Democratic Governor since the early depression years. The upcoming mayoralty race should have been a snap for 58-year-old Dilworth, but that was before Longstreth came along.

The Republican candidate, a 6-foot-6-inch Quaker socialite from Chestnut Hill, bowed into politics in 1952 with a few street-corner speeches for Eisenhower. His name was first put forward for the mayoralty nomination by a group of Eisenhower Republicans who called themselves the Republican Assembly and met at the home of Rep. Hugh D. Scott, former chairman of the Republican National Committee. The group had a strongly independent flavor and talked of liberating the party from machine rule. Having selected Longstreth, they offered him to the two factions into which the old organization has been split in recent years. Both turned him down, whereupon Hugh Scott decided he did not want a primary fight and dissolved his Assembly.

The regular organization nominated George P. Williams III, a former State Deputy Attorney General; another organization man, Chief Magistrate James J. Clothier, entered the primary on his own. But Longstreth refused to quit. As he began to campaign, it became evident that the Republican rank and file liked him It also became evident that the city's financial supporters considered him a good investment. Scott was persuaded to reconstitute the Assembly. Robert C. Duffy, titular head of the Republican City Committee, came out for Longstreth. Twenty-six ward leaders were led onto the bandwagon, and district boss William F. Meade told the 23 ward leaders who follow his commands to get aboard. The final vote on the three Republican competitors: Longstreth, 82,085; Williams, 53,618; Clothier, 44,177.

It would be a mistake, however, to assume that Scott, Meade and the financiers delivered the nomination to Longstreth. The independent voter, who has written the Philadelphia political story of the past eight years, was everyone's darling. "All Three GOP Candidates Claim To Be Independents" said a news headline two days before the voting.

National overtones are already being sounded in this local election. Two days after he was nominated, Longstreth was received with fanfare by the President. Among those accompanying him to the White House were Sen. James Duff, up for re-election next year; Sen. Martin, who will retire in 1958; and Rep. Scott, who has his eye on Martin's seat.

On the Democratic side, Mayor Clark's decision not to run for another term was determined by his desire for the Democratic Senatorial nomination next year. If Dilworth, running largely on Clark's record, can win, Clark's stock will be high in November, 1956.

## Minds Made Up

SEN. WALTER GEORGE, never one to mind standing alone, stated recently that foreign economic aid will be even more important if East-West tensions are reduced through negotiation. The Senator's judgment parallels the conclusions of recent expert studies on world economic growth and American foreign policy. But it stands in lonely contrast to other developments in the Administration, in Congress and in Asia.

More than a dozen key officials of the Foreign Operations Administration have quit since the President picked John B. Hollister to head a new aid agency, the International Co-operation Administration as it will be called after July 1. Hollister is the former Representative from Cincinnati and former law partner of Sen. Robert Taft who has sparked the Hoover Commission in its recommendations to prune government activity.

The Commission report on foreign aid, which was scheduled for release May 15, has now been held up "indefinitely," and there is some speculation that it may never be released because it would handicap Hollister in his new work. The report is known to be highly critical of foreign aid. A task force of the Commission held hearings on FOA earlier this year, and was described by officials who attended to be so openly hostile that one top witness commented to the Hoover Commission, "Why don't you save public funds by calling off these hearings? Your minds are already made up." The offending official is no longer


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connected with the foreign-aid program.

It appears that Hollister was not the source of the President's request to Congress for legislation which would permit the firing of any employee of the aid program earning more than $5,500, without the usual civil service safeguards. The Bureau of the Budget submitted this request in order to ease the merger of the new agency into the permanent structure of the State Department. Hollister has tried to avoid a general exodus of the trained foreign-aid staff by a letter circulated to all employees which states that "experienced, able and devoted subordinates are essential" and that "I shall expect to utilize as far as possible the services of those who have showed capacity and . . . devotion to their duties."

In Congress, the Senate hearings on foreign aid have been listless, seldom drawing more than two committee members. Republican members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee are busy again lining up votes to prohibit any aid after July 1 to neutral countries.

The 13 Asian countries which met recently at Simla, India, to discuss regional trade development under the American aid program, a favorite project of the outgoing American administrator, Harold Stassen, rejected the plan. This was interpreted by most editorial writers as an indication that Asia lacks cohesion, a view which contains much truth. But there was another reason for the conference failure which exerted at least equal weight: India "goofed" on the invitations. Official Indian notes calling the conference stated that the 13 nations would take up the apportionment of American aid to Asia. Actually the purpose was to discuss only a special $200 million fund for regional trade. Asians have less confidence in each other, and less faith in what collective judgments Asians might have on foreign aid, than they have in the bilateral negotiations with the US, whatever hazards they feel America poses. Even when India tried to correct the misunderstanding at the Simla conference, suspicions were aroused that India might somehow push the elbow of Uncle Sam as he was dealing the cards. The result was a total rejection of the regional proposal.

It is still possible for Mr. Hollister, if he receives Congressional authority, to administer the $200 million fund for projects which contribute to regional development in Asia, but the plan would now have no Asian sponsors.

## The Friend Indeed

THE TWENTIETH birthday of the Rural Electrification Administration inspired Vice President Nixon to make a speech the other day. He told 1,000 REA employees: "You know and I know the great benefits that have derived from this program . . . it makes farm life more interesting and pleasant."

In May, 1947, Representative Nixon (R, Calif.) voted against restoring a $25 million cut in REA loan funds; in February, 1948, he voted against an amendment to increase REA loan funds by $300 million; in April, 1948, he voted against a motion to add $100 million to REA loan funds; in June, 1948, he voted against a motion to give REA $450,000 more for administration. In July, 1951, Senator Nixon (R, Calif.) voted to cut sharply Department of Interior funds to serve REA electric co-ops.

"The REA program," declared Vice President Nixon the other day, "has operated in the traditional American pattern . . . it is one of the instances where government must supplement individual activity."

## Zipping Labor's Purse

SOME NOTION of the anxiety with which Republicans view next year's elections comes from state legislatures which the GOP controls. In three states, important from the electoral college point of view, there is a serious effort underway to deprive the Democrats of their most important single source of financial support, that which comes from organized labor. In two others—Indiana and Texas—shots have been fired in the same direction.

The drive started this year in Wisconsin where the unpopular speaker of the State Assembly, Mark Catlin, introduced a bill barring unions from contributing money "or anything of value" to political candidates, parties "or for any political purpose whatsoever." Under gag rule, the measure was pushed through the assembly, only Catlin appearing on behalf of the measure at bob-tailed hearings. In the State Senate no hearings were held and, despite a determined 25-hour filibuster, the measure was passed. Gov. Walter Kohler signed the bill May 20.

In Ohio a rural legislator, Rep. Elton Kile, introduced a similar measure which would deny to any union with a union shop contract the right to engage in political activity. At first the measure stalled in a House committee when two Republican members refused to go along but, after a two hour session with Republican leaders, one of them had his mind changed and the bill is now before the Ohio House of Representatives. Only Kile appeared on behalf of the measure at hearings. State Republican chairman Ray C. Bliss, concurrently with the fight in the Ohio legislature, told Ohio Republicans in Washington the thing he fears most next year is labor's political activity. Some suspect Gov. Frank Lausche (D) shares those fears.

Republicans in the Michigan State Senate have pushed a measure through that body similar to the Ohio proposal, denying unions with a union shop contract the right to engage in any kind of political activity. In the Michigan House of Representatives, however, there is a nearly equal division between Republicans and Democrats and more than enough votes to sustain an expected veto by Gov. Mennen Williams, should the measure get to his desk.

As yet no important Republican official, despite invitations to do so, has disavowed the drive legally to assure even greater disparity between Republican and Democratic campaign funds. Secretary of Labor Mitchell did, however, recently tell Republican women that labor is now better off than at any time in the past, thanks to activities of state legislatures. He did not elaborate.

## States' Rights Limited

ATTORNEY GENERAL Herbert Brownell has now set out to take back a large part of the Eisenhower Administration's "give away" of "tidelands" oil property.

Having released to the coastal states all the federal government's interest in the natural resources of the offshore submerged lands, the Administration is now embarrassed by the excessive claims of certain states as to the outer boundaries of these lands. In the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, sponsored by the Administration, Congress established these boundaries as including the seaward limits as they existed at the time the respective states became members of the union, but in no event to be more than three geographical miles into the Atlantic or Pacific Ocean or more than three marine leagues (about 10.5 miles) into the Gulf of Mexico.

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Louisiana has taken the position that its seaward boundaries extend outward at least three leagues and in some cases as far out as 27 miles. The Administration, on the other hand, contends that the Louisiana boundary is and always has been three geographical miles from the low-water mark. And when the Interior Department recently offered for lease various potential oil tracts more than three miles off the Louisiana coast, Louisiana immediately challenged the offers and threatened to lease many of the same tracts itself. Both sides agreed to a temporary truce so that the Justice Department could petition the Supreme Court for a resolution of this controversy. Such a petition has now been filed, along with a request that the Court modify its 1950 decree establishing paramount title in the US to all the lands off the Louisiana shores.

Historically, the Administration's position seems sound. From its earliest days the United States has firmly adhered to the policy of limiting to three miles its own claims of territorial waters and of recognizing no greater claims by other nations, as part of the doctrine of freedom of the seas. In supporting that policy in this instance, the Administration runs the risk of alienating the political support of the big oil companies which have discovered that the richest deposits of offshore oil lie more than three miles out.

## Dulles and Eden — Contrast in Technique

THE EMERGING defense organization in the oil rich Middle East, a security scheme parallel to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), suggests some interesting comparisons between the Eastern and Western corners of Asia, and even more interesting a difference in negotiating techniques between John Foster Dulles and Sir Anthony Eden.

Dulles, it will be remembered, personally negotiated the SEATO pact, signed at Manila last September. It was charted originally to be the collective security group for the nine countries of Free Asia lying closest to the South frontier of Communist China—countries stretching from Pakistan on the West to the Philippines on the East. But after a year of commuting to Asia in which he personally visited the capitals of most of these countries, Mr. Dulles was able to line up only three Asian signers—the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan.

The Middle East defense organization is conceived as a collective security group for those countries lying near the Southern frontier of the Soviet Union from Turkey on the West to Pakistan on the East.

These two regional bodies, together with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, facing the Soviet's Western frontier, and the special defense arrangements with Japan and Formosa in the Far East, would complete the pattern of collective security around the Soviet bloc, as originally outlined by Mr. George Kennan nearly 10 years ago.

Sir Anthony Eden announced at the beginning of 1955 that he had accepted as his own most urgent task for the current year the completion of the Middle East organization. How well he is succeeding may be judged by the time table in the first five months. In January, Iraqi officials took the initiative in opening discussions with Turkey. (Mr. Eden was not present.) In March, the Iraqi-Turkish defense pact was signed. (Mr. Eden was not present.) In April, Great Britain adhered to the Pact. (Mr. Eden was present for the first time.) In late April at the Asian-African conference in Bandung, both the Iraqi and Turkish delegates urged other Middle Eastern countries to join the Middle East defense organization, and Pakistan indicated unofficially that it would join "within a month." (Mr. Eden was not present.)

Sir Anthony's skill in using Asians to negotiate with their own neighbors reflects a British adroitness for which Americans are not noted. Neither do most American diplomats show a talent for staying in the background.

But it would be most unfair to the Secretary to compare only negotiating techniques, for the difference between the two regions is marked. Both regions face a Communist threat from the North, and both have a tendency to remain aloof from the Great Powers because of their colonial past, but there the similarities cease.

Southeast Asia has never had any real basis of unity, ancient or modern, unless the Japanese invasion of 1941-1945 could be called such an influence. The Middle East countries, by contrast, have been drawn together to varying degrees by the Pan-Islam movement, the Pan-Arab movement, the common background of the Ottoman Empire which broke up during World War I, and more recently the common opposition to Israel. This last force was the motivation for the Arab League, which celebrated its 10th birthday on March 22 of this year.

But perhaps the greatest contrast between the two regions is in available leadership. Mr. Dulles found in Southeast Asia no national figure who commanded regional respect, and who was prepared to undertake to form the regional defense organization. Sir Anthony found in the present premiers of Iraq and Turkey men eminently qualified for the task, and a special reason why Iraq was eager for the role. Iraq has been restive under Egyptian leadership in the Arab League. Egypt is a country with limited economic future, a future which does not depend primarily on world economic growth. Iraq, by contrast, is a country on the move, and headed for a greater role in world economic affairs if it links itself to an expanding world economy. Iraq has oil to provide capital for national development. It has vast unused agricultural resources in the once rich basin of the Tigris and Euphrates. It does not suffer from the overpopulation which stifles economic progress in Egypt. All these factors argue for a closer alignment between Iraq and the trading community of the Free World.

**Moreover, Iraq** through the family relationship of the Hashemite kings can bring to the Middle East organization a strong influence upon three of her neighbors, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. Since the break-up of the Turkish Empire there have been influential voices in these four countries urging political union. Economically they complement each other. Their access to the sea in three directions also offers mutual advantages. This "Greater Syria" union, as it is called, is not considered an immediate possibility, but the forces which have encouraged its development will also favor Iraqi leadership in a Middle East defense organization.

As Iraqi negotiations have shown promise, Mr. Eden's well-deserved reputation as a negotiator has been enhanced. He has proved that though adroitness and humility are not the only requirements of a diplomat, they help.

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# Communist Diplomacy

## *The US and Moral Superiority*

**by Michael Straight**

A NEW appeal is being directed from Moscow and Peking to the countries that border on the Communist world. It offers them substantial concessions if they will loosen their ties to the United States, and its offer is advanced within a new context. Previously world Communism presented separate bargains to each non-Communist nation while maintaining its own general power to wage aggressive war. Given this general power, the bargains were rejected as divisive and meaningless by nations allied with the United States. But now the Communist offer to each border nation is repeated within the general context of world disarmament and the settlement of the Cold War. And—meaningful or not—it is meeting with a far more positive response.

In differing ways, the three reports which follow from Tokyo, Paris and Bonn deal with a single theme: the attractive power of the new Communist appeal. In turn, a sound assessment of that attractive power is important in America if the present opportunity is not to turn into a present danger for the West.

But that assessment appears to be lacking so far in the response of our President and Secretary of State. Desirable as their optimism is, they are in danger of overestimating the inner significance of the Soviet shift and of underestimating its outward appeal.



TV report: Mr. Dulles explains why we shall win

Complacency, unqualified and unwarranted, was Mr. Dulles' mood as he signed the Austrian Treaty in Vienna. "Military power," he announced on that occasion, "has succumbed to the moral power of an ideal." But Mr. Molotov did not re-enact Lee's role at Appomattox. He hailed the Austrian Treaty as a triumph of Soviet diplomacy and, turning toward Germany, hinted at greater rewards to come for those who follow Austria's example.

Little has been surrendered by the Soviet Government since then; much has been gained. And while optimism should still be the order of the day as a pre-condition of boldness, the self-righteous complacency is out of place.

Rightly, Mr. Dulles referred to the Austrian Treaty as a success for the West, in his televised report of May 17 to President Eisenhower. Self-righteously, as in Vienna, he credited the success to our monopoly of moral principles. "These high moral principles are going to prevail," added Mr. Dulles, "and if we're behind them we'll automatically get the benefit. . . ."

Nothing is automatic in world politics, and the moral content of the immediate issues that divide East and West is at best obscure. But Mr. Dulles commits the US further to this line. We are the moral community, Mr. Dulles affirms in the May 17 report; the Communists are the outlaws, bereft of any claim to morality but forced by our strength to conform to our rules.

Why should they conform? "Well," answered Mr. Dulles:

> I've thought of this, Mr. President, that in every one of our well-ordered communities there are a lot of people who don't believe in their hearts in the rules and the laws that are there, but they find it more convenient to conform and not always to be bucking these things. And, therefore, in any well-ordered community there are a lot of people who live up to the rules and the ordinances and so forth even though they don't perhaps believe in them very well themselves.
>
> It may possibly be the case that the Soviet Union after this experience of trying to buck everything may be feel-

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ing that it may be more convenient for them to conform to some of the rules and practices of the civilized world community.

Comforting as this analogy is, it is also misleading. For while flexibility in tactics is the essence of Leninism, there is no evidence to suggest that, even as a tactical shift, the Russians have decided to conform to the rules and practices of what Mr. Dulles calls "the civilized world community." No overwhelming preponderance of force on our side compels them to do so, and no critical weakness within Russia that we know of would persuade her rulers that such a retreat is required of the Soviet State. The analogy is highly unreal which pictures the Soviet rulers as subjects, however unwilling, of a "well-ordered community" in which law and the instruments of law enforcement are the monopoly of the allies.

The Soviet leaders certainly are engaged in carting away the deadwood from the scenes of the world struggle. That action is required by their Marxist appraisal of a constantly changing struggle which dictates changing tactics in response. If now the Soviet leaders have decided to shift the battle to new ground, it is because they have concluded that on the new ground they will do better. The ground they seem to have selected is the military neutralization of the border nations in Europe. If so, this shift reflects in part at least the conviction that military neutrality is the role that the border nations themselves will seek as Europe's role becomes less important and more painful in a war fought with hydrogen bombs. To ignore the impact of the nuclear arms race upon Europe, to stand fast on prior plans while the Russians shift, in the belief that they are retreating in deference to our growing strength, is to invite a substantial transfer of political support to the Soviet side.

There is no evidence that Soviet aims have changed. "The Soviet aim," said Konrad Adenauer in October, 1954, "is to disinterest the United States in European questions and to eliminate Atlantic influence from European affairs." That no doubt is still the Soviet objective, which the Kremlin is pursuing in bilateral approaches to Sweden, to Yugoslavia and to each European state.

IN THESE approaches the Kremlin's purpose, as always, is to gain as much as it can and to give as little in return. In Austria, it offers independence in exchange for a guarantee of neutrality; in Yugoslavia, friendship in return for Tito's independence of the West. In Germany, the Soviet objective is to block or at least to delay the implementation of the Paris and Bonn accords providing for West German rearmament and integration into the defensive system of the West. The least costly method for the Kremlin to try first is to offer a limitation on the armed forces of East Germany if West Germany in return will scale down its rearmament program from the 12 divisions sanctioned by the West. If this is to be the hard offer that lies beneath the more grandiose proposals, then it will be welcomed by important groups in Germany and also in France. It will be resisted by NATO and by the US, and when it fails the Kremlin may move on to its next line of aggressive defense. There, "almost free elections" may be offered in the East Zone, in exchange for the evacuation of foreign troops and the neutralization of a United Germany along Austrian lines. Again Germany will balk at any such restrictions upon her sovereignty, and with united Western support. And so the larger proposals of the Kremlin for the creation of a belt of neutral states in Europe may emerge.

At this point, a debate will be due on the nature and consequences of European neutrality. We are ill prepared for any such debate, and we may suffer great setbacks politically if in accordance with Mr. Dulles' present mood we direct the debate toward moral judgments in order that we may condemn neutralism on moral grounds.

Ultimately, we hope, our position derives from moral principle. But moral superiority is not sure to follow us, as the lamb followed Mary, wherever we go. For the truth is that, in this debate at least, few Europeans will agree that morality is ours alone. Susceptible as they must be to the neutralist appeal, Europeans will remember that isolationism, our own latter-day expression of neutralism, was invariably placed by Herbert Hoover, Charles Lindbergh and their associates on highly moralistic grounds. The folly of our isolationists and the confusions created by their pretensions of moral superiority should warn us against relying upon similar claims today.

Many forces today contribute to European neutralism. They include political expediency, cultural pride, national prejudice and military logic. They further include the pacifist rejection of nuclear war on moral grounds and the broader moral belief that Europe, by serving as a middle ground, can lead the world to peace. To scorn these moral considerations, to pretend that the non-moral considerations do not exist, and on this basis to ask Europe to reject neutralism on moral grounds is to place the debate in the realm most subject to confusion. In fact, by surrendering to the Kremlin the moral pretensions of neutrality we can go far toward losing all that has been gained in Europe by the common efforts of the West.

It is much wiser, surely, to reappraise the term *neutrality* and to strip it of the misconceptions it has led to over the past five years. New nations, such as India, which have found it expedient to follow a course of non-involvement in the Cold War, have clothed their expediency in the pretense that involvement is uncalled for because there are no moral and spiritual values at stake in the power struggle between Russia and the United States. This claim, of course, is deeply offensive to Americans who will combat it with indignation wherever it is expressed. The offensiveness of the claim, however, can and must be separated from the logic of the position. In Europe, above all, the outcome of the developing debate with Russia may turn on our ability to distinguish between moral and military neutrality. Moral neutrality

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invites moral judgment and justifies moral censure. Military neutrality, which stems from quite different motivations, must be considered in terms of its feasibility and practical effect. Moral neutrality expresses indifference to evil and is not something that we can or should submit to bargaining. Military neutralization as it may present itself may be subject to negotiation because it can work in favor of the free nations if it is achieved on the right terms.

For the moment the Kremlin is endeavoring to create beyond its belt of satellite nations a secondary belt of neutralized nations separated from the United States. That effort can have no appeal to the West. It becomes meaningful for the allies when the two belts are joined and treated as one. If in exchange for the withdrawal of US forces from Western Germany the Kremlin offered the withdrawal of the Red Army from East Germany *and* Poland, a rough parity might be created. If in exchange for a further neutralization of NATO powers the Kremlin proposed the neutralization of its other European satellites, the rough parity in concessions might be maintained. No such move is probable by the Kremlin until the Communist grip upon the satellites is fully consolidated. When that time comes in the Kremlin view (and a recent study by experts of the Hoover Institute suggests that, at least in military terms, it may not be far off), then the military neutralization of all Europe may move closer to realization.

If the objective to which our diplomacy is directed stops short of the downfall of the Soviet regime itself, then the retreat of the Soviet armies to their own borders is a gain for which we should be prepared to make significant concessions in return. If we believe that the regimes left by the Kremlin in the satellite nations are immovable, the gain is limited. But if we believe that nationalism will reassert itself in Eastern Europe once the Red Army withdraws, then, for us, that withdrawal is worth much more. One determinant of the significance of a Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe would be the extent of free interchange permitted between Eastern Europe and the West. But even if this is subject to agreement, we know from sad experience that agreements on matters as imprecise and as important as this have not proved long lasting.

Instead of seeking to perfect unenforceable agreements such as these it is more profitable to treat the military neutralization of Europe in a still larger context. It represents the military non-involvement of European nations in the larger struggle led by the great powers, and its vitality depends on whether the intensity of the larger struggle is increasing or diminishing. In the presence of a continuing nuclear arms race a belt of military neutrals could not develop or survive in Europe. In the presence of gradual disarmament by the larger powers it might exist and could contribute to peace.

If one thing is certain, it is that given present tensions neither side will sacrifice hard won and genuine assets for the hypothetical assurances of adversaries. The withdrawal of foreign troops from Europe, the reconstitution of NATO, the unification of Germany and limitation of all national armaments will progress only if they progress together and in relation to each other as part of a tacit, but agreed on, expression of President Eisenhower's view that there is no alternative to peace.

# Less Entangling Alliances

## Reports from Tokyo, Paris and Bonn on the reappraisal of relations with the Communist World now taking place

### TRADE WITH RED CHINA

JAPAN'S territories have been cut in half since 1940; its population is up by 15 million. One quarter of the national wealth has disappeared; the nation that built the world's largest battleships is dependent upon the United States for its security, and upon dollar spending to fill its ricebowls. But Japan's aim has not changed—only her methods. The aim is still the integration of Japanese industry and Asian markets into some sort of co-prosperity sphere. Japan cannot—she dare not—forget that she is economically more dependent upon Asia than on any other continent. No rebuffs by Peking, no abortive trade pacts with Communist China can change that fact. And because the West does not always fully comprehend the depth and intensity of Japan's interest in, and need of, Asia, many Japanese complain that their friends do not trouble to understand them.

With heavy competition from Shanghai textiles in Southeast Asian markets—and last year's trade with Communist China represented only 1.1 percent of total exports—some Japanese may entertain private doubts whether Asian trade will ever again provide a solution for their country's economic ills. But they dare not publicly admit to these doubts.

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So while Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama offers to do "almost anything"—except to relinquish the conception of "two Chinas" (that would risk the loss of $190 million worth of annual Formosan trade)—to foster friendly relations with Red China, Ex-Premier Shigeru Yoshida nurses the vision of Japan becoming the comprador between Asia and the West, with trade orders routed through Tokyo. And Japan's newspapers devote more space to the affairs of Asia than to any other single subject.

On this issue, no fundamental differences of opinion separate the various Japanese political parties. In July, 1953, both Houses of the Japanese Diet unanimously adopted (at the prompting of the Japan-China Trade Promotion League comprising 340 Diet members) a resolution stating:

> Be it resolved that the Government should take appropriate steps to promote trade between Japan and the People's Republic of China by speedily lowering the restrictions which impede that trade to the level, at least for the present, of the restrictions observed by West European countries and relaxing restrictions on travel necessary for the conduct of that trade.

Last year Mr. Kiichi Aichi, then Minister of International Trade and Industry, told me:

> The decrease in our trade with Communist China is due to the confrontation between the two worlds. Japan is a participant in arrangements with the United States, Britain and other free world countries to control exports to Communist China and is one of the countries which has most strictly abided by the arrangements. Although there is no change in our policy in this respect, Japan must expand her foreign trade in order to establish a self-supporting economy and give more positive co-operation to the community of free nations. The desire to expand trade with Communist China has arisen as a part of a unanimous desire of Japanese industry to expand trade generally and strengthen the Japanese economy. It is my hope that the day will soon come when more normal trade relations can be established between Japan and Communist China and when, by fair transactions between the people of both countries, there will be created expanding opportunities to promote their mutual interests under conditions of stability.

This viewpoint still remains substantially the basis of Japan's official attitude on the subject of Japan-Red China trade relations. It is widely agreed by Japanese officials and industrialists that, because of changed conditions and trading patterns, the days when—as during the 1934-36 period—Japan obtained 31 percent of her total imports of iron ore, 37.6 percent of her salt, and 29.4 percent of her coal from continental China, and sent 18 percent of her total exports to China and Manchuria, are unlikely to return.

Prime Minister Hatoyama

Economically, Japan-China trade is today generally viewed as at best a palliative, not a remedy, for the nation's imbalance of international commerce. The approach adopted by the advocates of greater trade was outlined to me recently by Mr. Shozo Murata, president of the Association for the Promotion of International Trade and a spokesman for those sections of Japanese industry most actively concerned with promoting expanded China trade, in these words:

> At the present time, the situation is that Red China will export anything, and so Japan is purchasing more from that country than we are selling—resulting in an unbalanced state of trade which makes it difficult for us to pay for what we are importing.
>
> It is not my opinion that Communist trade could soon be developed to a point at which it would balance trade between Japan and other nations. The reason I have sought to promote increased Red China trade is that Japan currently has an annual deficit in international trade of $700-$800 million, of which about $500 million is represented by imports from the United States.
>
> If we look at the itemized figures of Japan's trade with that country, there appears to be little chance of increasing exports to the United States. It is the same with Europe and South America. Yet some way must be found to overcome our current trading deficit, and if increased trade with Red China offsets the deficit by only $100 million—or even $10 million—it would help by that much toward balancing payments.

Tadao Miyashita, professor of economics at Kobe University, in a paper prepared last year, summed up the same "case" in these words:

> Postwar Japan is faced with the necessity of developing trade with the Chinese market even more urgently than before the war. Holding a population of close upon a hundred million confined to four small islands with poor resources of food and raw materials, Japan can find no effective means other than the development of her industry in order to provide full employment for her people and raise their standard of living. To the above, expansion of foreign trade is imperative. At this moment, a new regime has come into power in Continental China, going ahead with a program of steady economic development, while we find ourselves confronted with the task of overcoming depression and accomplishing economic self-support compatible with political independence. In the meantime, Japanese industry and that of Continental China are in distinctly different stages of development, so that the trade between the two countries is complementary to each other.

Japanese official quarters, nervous about American reactions to any show of enthusiasm for increased Red

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China trade, are disinclined to discuss prospects—the official line being that any large increase in trade cannot be expected in view of existing obstacles, including the difficulties, in the absence of diplomatic relations, of arranging settlements. For the same reason, the government maintained an attitude of aloofness in regard to the recent visit of a Peking trade delegation to Tokyo—and it needed only a cautious hint of possible American disapproval to cause many large Japanese firms to have second thoughts about opening their plants to inspection by the Communist visitors. Privately, the Japanese Government's view is that the country must consider the effects of any closer relations with Red China on the West, and weigh any possible benefits accruing from increased trade and normalized relations with the Communist bloc against the trading and other benefits of the present pro-Western alignment. Osaka's exporting firms, on the other hand, are less interested in the total volume of China trade than in finding markets for the steel, machinery and other goods they have to sell.

Are the present stringent trade controls necessary? Some observers have suggested it is foolish to require Japan to behave as though she belongs to the West when the nation is economically and geographically an integral part of East Asia. Others have advanced the view that a relaxation of trade restrictions would demonstrate to the Japanese that the possibilities of a major resumption of trade do not at present exist. Peking, of course, blames the lack of increased trade on the absence of normal relations and the limitations imposed by the United States. But at least as important is the refusal of Red China to adhere to the Japanese viewpoint that "business is business and politics something else"—and its attempts to make propaganda capital out of normal trading transactions. And back of it all is a growing awareness in Japan of the dangers that might be involved in strengthening Red China's productive power to the detriment, later, of Japan's competitive position in Asian markets.

But despite the political implications and dangers involved, the attraction of closer relations with continental China continues to fascinate and beckon. Japan inherited much of its culture from China, and the average Japanese feels a sentimental attachment to that country that has no counterpart in its attitude to the West.

> Our relations with China [wrote Professor Tadao Miyashita] date far back to ancient times and widely involve all of the economic, social and cultural aspects. What must be further stressed is the sense of mutual kinship as Asian nations. Any policy which aims at anything like a complete and permanent severing of the ties between the two countries will never be admitted by the national feeling of a majority of the Japanese people.

It is for that reason that the trade issue cuts across party lines. Japanese of all political opinions and none equally tend to believe that a resumption of friendly and normal relations between the two countries is in line with the national ideas and ideals. And, conversely, that present limitations on the exchange of persons and goods between Japan and China are unnatural. And a sense of urgency is injected into the debate by Japan's economic weakness and a perhaps exaggerated view of China's growing strength and prestige.

Strategic considerations also enter into the question. Japan has a lively interest in minimizing China's dependence upon Russia—and increasing its reliance upon Japanese industry. As many thoughtful Japanese see it, the one hope of China ever being in a position to exert its independence *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union would be through the development of close bonds with industrial Japan. Taking the long view, they believe that the possibilities inherent in such a development far outweigh the risks involved in a relaxing of the trade embargo.

*Tokyo* HESSELL TILTMAN

## AN INDEPENDENT GERMANY

THE REACTION of West Germans to the Soviet-Austrian Agreement was, first of all, optimistic. Have not the Russians, they asked, taken a decisive step which even the Western Powers earlier declared would be a test of the Kremlin's good will? Why, they then asked, cannot the Germans make the same kind of deal?

Differences of opinion have turned mainly upon whether the cases of Austria and of Germany are similar or, if they are not, how the success in Vienna can be turned to advantage here. When the two cases are examined *logically*, few people find much similarity between them. Austria is a small country of seven million; a united Germany would have 10 times that number. Austria was never a menace to the Soviet Union; she did not invade Russian territory. And whereas Austria has had no Communist Party of any size or importance since 1945, in the Eastern half of Germany a strong Communist regime stands ready to take over control of the whole country. But despite the lack of similarity between the cases of Austrian independence and German reunification, the Russians want the Germans to think that the similarity is real, and that unity is possible on somewhat the same terms. Spokesmen of the USSR and of the Communist satellite countries are continually emphasizing that here is Germany's chance to get what she wants. All the Germans need to do is follow Austria's example by agreeing to sacrifice military alliances, to maintain only a small defense force and to insist upon the withdrawal of foreign military forces and installations from German territory. In other words, Germany need only turn its back on the Paris Treaties and become neutral.

The term "neutrality" is not popular in West Ger-

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Social Democrat Ollenhauer

many, having been replaced by another word, *Buendnislosigkeit* (freedom from alliances). In fact, there are probably fewer neutralists in Western Germany than is generally assumed abroad. But there are many who reject the recently ratified Paris Treaties, and see them mainly as an opportunity for new negotiations with the Soviet Union. Thus, the Social Democratic Party recently outlined a program for reunification which, while honoring those treaties, suggests they should be changed by agreement between the signatory states. The military obligations accepted by the Federal Republic should be done away with or replaced by new ones within the framework of a regional pact for European security. This suggestion seems to envisage a kind of "stand-still agreement" which would free the Federal Republic from military commitments for a special period during which further attempts at reaching agreement on reunification would be made.

To those who support this point of view, the new Soviet-Austrian Treaty is seen as evidence that the USSR is now willing to be conciliatory in Central Europe, provided only that the West can be patient. These people conveniently ignore the fact that the Soviet Union has considered Austria important not for its own sake but as a pawn in European strategy. The goal of such a Russian policy is not only a bank of neutral states in Europe as far West as possible, but also the withdrawal of American armed forces to the US.

The German attitude may be explained, though not necessarily justified, by the fact that for 10 years the Federal Republic has had no foreign policy of its own. The allied policy of complete surrender became one of complete dependence. Most Germans would probably deny that they have come to assume that, whatever happens, allied troops would be either on the Rhine or in the vicinity, in case of danger. Yet, often more unconsciously than consciously, many of their political arguments on rearming are based upon this assumption. Under such conditions, it is natural they should think that the greatest task is to win over the principal opponent of reunification, namely, the Soviet Union. This attitude is strengthened by the view held in some quarters here that the Western Powers have forgotten reunification and regard the Paris Agreements as an end in themselves.

It is not surprising that people abroad are concerned when they find some of the leading bourgeois German politicians talking about the possibility of agreement with the Russians on "not-quite-free elections" in the Soviet Zone. There is such talk, based upon the belief that whatever happens the non-Communist elements in Eastern Germany would gain a tremendous victory in any appeal to the population. Even if this proved to be the fact, however, it would not mean the elimination of Communism as an effective force in this country. For the Communists' activities are by no means based upon parliamentary control alone. Completely free elections would involve a risk, but one which the Western world is prepared to take. If, however, elections were "not-quite-free," the risk of Communist control would be very great.

It is among those in Western Germany whose minds do not seem to have been made up on the question of how much they would be prepared to sacrifice in the way of individual freedom and security for the sake of reunification that the Soviet Union hopes to make propaganda by the recent settlement with Austria. There is a natural temptation for Germans to assume that, whatever the facts of past experience, it is still possible to "negotiate from hope" and let the consequences take care of themselves.

At the moment Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and his party stand firmly behind the policy of moving slowly and carefully toward reunification. Many other leaders in public life, however, seem to feel that more trust should be placed in Russian motives; to them the ultimate goal of German foreign policy is independence from both West and East.

*Bonn* J. EMLYN WILLIAMS

## WINNING THE NEXT ELECTION

A PHOTOGRAPH of Neville Chamberlain has been hung in the place of honor above the fireplace in the Conservative Party's central office in London. Until a few days before the top-level big-four conference was decided, that place had been occupied by a photograph of Sir Winston Churchill. Now the man of blood, sweat and tears looks down from a back wall with Baldwin and Bonar Law.

Certainly appeasement is again stylish, and not only in Britain. But this time it is two-way appeasement. No parallel of the coming meeting at the summit can be made with Munich or Yalta. For one thing, the balance of forces is too even. For another, the Russians now seem at least as eager for appeasement, and apparently even more willing to make dramatic concessions, than our side. Peace *for* our time, if not *in* it, is the popular formula in a vast area that stretches from the Scilly Islands, Spain, Scandinavia and Sicily all the way to the nearer side of Siberia—though not yet to the Formosa Strait.

In most of Sir Anthony's election campaign speeches, more than half his words have been devoted to a conciliatory version of foreign policy, on peace rather than prosperity. He has talked more like Chamberlain than like Churchill, and at times perilously like Bevan. It seems plain that the Tory command has seen a thaw in the Cold War, and finds the need to use the arguments

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of those who long have favored direct diplomatic negotiations with the Russians, that is, Labour.

Two-way appeasement is even more popular in France and Italy than in Britain; and linked with it is a strong feeling that since war can be avoided (*for* our time), the attention to—and expenses for—military security should be subordinated to economic reform and social reorganization. French Premier Faure and his colleagues in the government hastened to claim both the decision to invite the Russians to a top-level conference and the new Soviet disarmament proposals as victories for French diplomacy. If so, they weren't victories for Faure and his Right-of-Center team. The credit is due Pierre Mendès-France, once a close colleague, now a bitter opponent of the Premier in the Radical Socialist Party, and also to Jules Moch, the Socialist leader. And Faure's biggest task is to win—if necessary, against PMF—for himself and his friends the national election which is to take place next year.

PMF, more than any other man in France or anywhere, for that matter, was responsible for the success of Western European Union, and for getting West Germany into "the concert" of Western Powers. In his UN speech last November, he called for a big-four meeting to take place in May, and made Austria the test of Russia's good will. His scheme for arms control is reflected in the new Moscow proposals. And the change in political climate and popular mood began not with the Russo-Austrian agreement in Moscow but with the Geneva agreement on Indo-China, for which PMF (with a strong assist from Eden) was largely responsible.

Both in France and in Italy, the most important domestic political trend is the strong competition for the favor of the Socialists. Recent French provincial elections showed a marked trend toward the Left. PMF only a few days ago carried out a species of personal *coup d'etat* in his own Radical Socialist Party in favor of a co-operative arrangement with the Socialists.

**In Italy, the new** President, Giovanni Gronchi, stands for co-operation between the left-wing of the Christian Democratic Party and the fellow-traveling Socialists of Pietro Nenni. His statement, on taking office, was a resounding confirmation of this goal. Yet neither Gronchi nor Mendès-France wants a new Popular Front with the Communists.

But a Popular Front is precisely what the Communist Parties in both countries *do* want and are willing to pay heavily for. They are as eager as Moscow to prevent the definitive incorporation of Germany in the Atlantic Alliance. They want not merely the neutralization of a unified Germany but the neutralization of Europe itself.

Palmiro Togliatti of the Italian Communist Party has said that if Nenni allies his left-wing Socialists with the Christian Democrats, he, the CP chief, will go even further Right. In France, the effort is being made to widen co-operation between the Radical Socialists, led by PMF, and the Socialists to include the Communists too. At the recent meeting of the central committee of the French Communist Party, François Billoux compared the present situation with that of 1934. From now on, Mr. Billoux said, the major goal of the Communist Party would be the making of a united front.

Socialist Nenni

Both in France and in Italy, the domestic political situation is changing in unforeseen ways. For the first time since 1948, Italian labor is breaking away from the Communist Party—though not necessarily from a Tito-type Communism; and Nenni might be the instrument for real unification of the (dissident) Communist labor movement with the labor forces of the Christian Democrats and the smaller non-Communist parties. The Vatican's toughened policy of public subsidy for parochial schools, as has been seen in Belgium and certain parts of Germany, is reopening an old and bitter issue in France. And the Communists' eagerness to provide votes on this issue may be tempting bait to the Socialists and Radical Socialists, both of whom are opposed to state help for Catholic schools.

Why do the Soviets want the united fronts so badly at this time? Why are the Communist Parties in Western Europe in favor of two-way appeasement? The answer seems to be more complex than that Moscow simply wants weapons to be used against Germany's entry into the Western bloc. The Kremlin is looking toward its own domestic problems, which may be more serious than the outside world knows; it is also looking eastward toward Asia. It needs a protective area—a new *cordon sanitaire*—in the West. It is growing aware that new weapons are gradually making the old—including huge land armies—almost obsolete; that in Europe at least the chance of a local war limited to a conflict without nuclear weapons is virtually nonexistent.

So the Soviets may truly want some form of disarmament. They may also want to neutralize Europe by a chain of buffer states running from Sweden through Germany, Switzerland and Austria to Yugoslavia. And one of the purposes of the united fronts would be to resist the movement, already gaining ground, to barter German neutralization for the freedom and neutralization of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

*Paris* FRANK GORRELL

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# The Democrats Like Ike

**by Robert L. Riggs**

WHO REMEMBERS that when the Democrats assumed control of Congress last January, they were going to create there the issues which would make it impossible for a Republican Presidential nominee, even one so popular as Dwight D. Eisenhower, to win in 1956?

Of that dream about all the Democrats have left is the fervent hope they can get House and Senate out of town before their members go farther in revealing the outstanding political fact of our times. That fact is that not only do the Democrats like Ike better than the Republicans do, but they also like what Ike likes better than do most members of his own party.

The ludicrous aspect to this revelation is that it came at the moment when the Democrats' national spokesmen finally screwed their courage to the point of making direct attacks upon the hitherto untouchable Eisenhower. They have accepted the obvious truth that they can't win a Presidential election next year by arguing, as they did in the Congressional contests last year, that they would support Eisenhower better than the Republicans would.

But whether they meant it or not in their campaign speeches last fall, the Democrats have demonstrated during four and a half months that their hearts still belong to Eisenhower, just as they did when so many of them were trying to get him to be their candidate seven years ago.

This is most easily demonstrated, of course, in the realm of foreign affairs. On that subject, the cleavage is so clear between the Eisenhower Republicans and those who claim to wear the mantle of Robert A. Taft that it becomes easy for the Democrats to be the President's chief sustainer. What is not so clear is that, for all their talk, most Congressional Democrats feel cozily comfortable in the dynamic-conservative-progressive middle-of-the-roadism to which Dwight Eisenhower rather vaguely and fuzzily is dedicated in domestic affairs. Many a Democrat dreams at night of a what-might-have-been if he could have had Eisenhower at the head of his party, presiding over a mild program of do-goodism and of diluted welfare-statism.

The statistics compiled by *Congressional Quarterly* tell the story pretty clearly. On 40 significant rollcalls since January, the Democrats supported the President 57 percent of the time. To be sure, their record wasn't as good as that achieved by the Republicans. Under the whip and lash of party discipline, and always aware that they have to have Eisenhower in 1956 if they hope to win, the Republicans gave him their support 64 percent of the time. The difference, you might say, is that most Democratic support was a free-will offering to the Republican President, while much of the support from his own party members was given grudgingly.

When you sift foreign affairs out of that total of 40 rollcalls, you find that on eighteen tests involving the nation's relations with other countries, the Democrats liked Ike a lot better than did his Republicans. They were with him 69 percent of the time, according to *Congressional Quarterly*, while the Republicans stood with him only 52 percent of the time on foreign policy.

But the rollcalls don't tell the whole story on domestic issues. It's what happened, or failed to happen, in the quiet of committees which reflects how completely the Democrats have failed to develop the issues over which they burned with such flaming zeal in January.

There was, you may have forgotten, the matter of public power versus private power. Its symbol was the Dixon-Yates contract by which the enemies of the Tennessee Valley Authority had begun to nibble at that agency which epitomizes the New Deal and Fair Deal. The Democratic victory in the Congressional elections,

**In 1955 Republicans, on the average, displayed less enthusiasm in upholding the President on his major proposals to Congress than they did in 1954. Democratic support of Mr. Eisenhower, on the other hand, increased greatly between 1954 and 1955.**

| | *Republican* | | *Democrat* | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1954 | 1955 | 1954 | 1955 |
| SUPPORT | | | | |
| Both Chambers | 74% | 64% | 39% | 57% |
| Senate | 68 | 74 | 40 | 60 |
| House | 77 | 61 | 39 | 56 |
| OPPOSITION | | | | |
| Both Chambers | 18 | 24 | 46 | 34 |
| Senate | 24 | 11 | 47 | 27 |
| House | 15 | 27 | 45 | 36 |

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narrow though it was, was to be the signal for driving the private power lobbyists out of their seats of power. It was going to be the end of Dixon-Yates, the end of Interior Secretary McKay's deals to keep the hydroelectric sites of the Far West out of the hands of public power advocates. But Dixon-Yates goes on unabated, and McKay still follows the "partnership" policy so dear to this Administration.

Next to the power issue, the Democrats were emotionally devoted to setting right some of the affairs over which Mrs. Oveta Culp Hobby had clinched a restraining fist. There was going to be action in the field of federal assistance to the public schools of the country. It was going to be prompt enough and big enough to cure without delay the shocking shortage of classrooms. If Mrs. Hobby stood in its way, she would be exposed as the Secretary of "not-too-much Health, Education and Welfare." If Eisenhower dared to stand with her, he would shrink so in public estimation that he would be well-advised not to yield to Republican pleas that he run in 1956.

But for all their ringing of the classroom bell, the Democrats are no farther along with federal assistance to the public schools than they have been in previous sessions of Congress. Their sweeping proposals, along with the gingerly efforts of Mrs. Hobby and the President, are dying the usual death in Senate and House Committees. As before, rigor mortis was induced by the familiar ailments of what to do about money for segregated schools and for parochial schools.

In various fields of the welfare state, including adequate health insurance, the Democrats were going to reveal the Scrooge instincts of Mrs. Hobby and her President. But if the Secretary of HEW leaves us soon, her departure will be the result of her Department's bungling with the Salk vaccine, rather than because of any issue stirred up by the Democrats.

If there was one thing that took a beating during the campaign, it was the Republican "new look" in national defense. It was belabored as "more bang for a buck," a fraud by which the people were being deprived of the armed forces needed to protect them just so Secretary George Humphrey could satisfy a banker's instinct for a balanced budget. To a man, the Democrats were going to support Stuart Symington (Mo.) in his efforts to ram down the throats of the Eisenhower Administration the adequate armed forces which the five-star General lacked the temerity to ask.

It is true that Senator Symington, a former Secretary of the Air Force, continues to hammer away in his effort to increase that branch of the military establishment. But when the Defense Department appropriation was before the House on May 11, only a corporal's guard of Democrats rallied around when the attempt was made to compel the Administration to maintain larger ground forces. The reduction in expenditures, along with the reduction in forces, was so appealing to House members of both




parties that the President was able to win an impressive victory.

There was the stock market investigation. The Democrats proclaimed it was part of their mandate from the people to make sure that another Republican Administration didn't encourage the market to lead us into an economic catastrophe such as we had in 1929. But so fierce became the cry against "irresponsible radicals" that so unpink a Senator as William J. Fulbright (Ark.) was forced to call off his investigation.

One of the favorite whipping boys for Democratic campaigners was Secretary Ezra T. Benson, defender of flexible farm-price supports. But for all the beating he took, and in spite of the apparent victory which rigid 90 percent supports won in the House the other day, no one

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has any illusions that the Eisenhower-Benson farm program will be tossed out.

In the one area where the historic position of their party required them to stand firmly with Eisenhower, the Democrats acted more like Republicans than did the President. It was only the vigilance of that old-fashioned Democrat, Harry Byrd, that his colleagues were kept from deserting the trail blazed by Cordell Hull in establishing the reciprocal trade program. What came out of the Senate Finance Committee under the guise of a three-year extension of the Reciprocal Trade Act is a lot closer to high-tariff protection than it is to free trade.

The most interesting aspect of that fight was that members of the House, who are closer to the people, were far less susceptible to home-industry pressures than were the Senators. Long-time supporters of the trade program, like Alben W. Barkley, felt the heat from coal mine operators, from unemployed miners, from the sick fluorspar industry. The South which raised the cry of tariff for revenue only when it was an agricultural area, wants protection from Japanese textiles now that it is luring spinning and weaving mills away from New England. It was all the White House and Senator Byrd could do to keep Southern Senators from acting like Grundy Republicans.

Let us draw the kindly veil of forgetfulness over Sam Rayburn's abortive effort to enact a flat $20 tax reduction. It wasn't anything the Democrats had promised to do. In fact, it caught most of them by surprise when the House Speaker sprung it on them. But it served the Democrats two purposes. First, it took some of the luster off Sam Rayburn's reputation for political sagacity and cunning. It was he who led the party into a trap which enabled the Republicans to give Eisenhower a most impressive victory over an issue on which editorial writers could praise him and his party for standing firm for fiscal responsibility. Second, it demonstrated that Senate Leader Lyndon Johnson can, under the proper goading, be induced to lead his followers into battle.

The blow to Rayburn's prestige came at a time when he was taking the lead in political sorties against the President's prestige. But when Rayburn's attacks on the President are analyzed, they are found to consist mostly of personal complaints. He is personally offended because the President has not rebuked his Vice President for referring to Rayburn's party as the party of twenty years of treason. He is personally offended because his old friend Eisenhower has not consulted with him about legislative proposals. He is personally offended because the President is selecting Democratic members of bipartisan commissions without asking Rayburn's opinions about possible appointees.

But on matters of principle, it is difficult to imagine any great divergence between the views of the President and of the Speaker of the House. Hence it was all the more dramatic when Rayburn pulled from his hat the rabbit of a $20 income tax reduction. It did not fire

"Student Johnson and Teacher Rayburn"

his fellow Democrats in the House with any great zeal. In fact, it took every ounce of official influence and personal devotion for Rayburn to get his bill through the chamber.

For Lyndon Johnson, the Rayburn maneuver presented a dilemma. Far more than most Democrats, Johnson has played the role of "I like Ike better than Republicans like him." From 1952 to 1954 he lived in constant terror that some Ike-Liker such as Governor Allan Shivers might defeat him in the Texas Senatorial primary. In addition, Johnson had in the Senate the problem of Harry F. Byrd and Walter F. George. No tax measure could get through the Senate if those two influential Democrats stood with the Republicans in opposition. It is well known that Johnson is never eager for a fray under any circumstances. Much less is he spoiling for a fight he can't possibly win.

But what he might not do for an abstract political principle, Johnson was ready to do to try to save the face of his old friend Sam Rayburn. Though he took his defeat in the Senate, he lost only three Democrats besides George and Byrd. It was a useful demonstration that the majority party can be made to act as a unit. It is even possible to believe that the same skill might be called into play to serve a cause higher than the bailing out of an old friend from Texas.

There is, however, no evidence that the Democratic Congressional leadership will be directed against the President's proposals. Oh, Eisenhower will encounter some defiance on such matters as how much to increase the salaries of postal workers. Such odd allies as Harry Byrd and Albert Gore will help upset the President's ideas on how to finance the construction of highways. But on a majority of issues, the Democrats are going to continue to like what Ike likes.

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# BOOKS & COMMENT

## *Maritain's View of Modern Art*

*by Joseph Frank*

JACQUES MARITAIN's book on *Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry,* now made available in a low-priced paper back edition, is the latest in a series of works published in recent years that have given new life to the almost defunct discipline of aesthetics. With the rise of positivism in the mid-nineteenth century, the great flowering of German Idealist aesthetics came to a close; and the study of aesthetics, like the study of practically everything else, was turned into a branch of physio-psychology. In more recent years, aestheticians have quarreled over the meaning of meaning, or have devoted themselves to analyzing the various uses made of the word "beauty" by their incautious predecessors. In short, aesthetics has been turned into everything in the world except an attempt to understand the nature and significance of works of art; but there are signs that a renaissance of genuine aesthetic theory may well be at hand.

*Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry,* by Jacques Maritain (Meridian Books; $1.35).

Indeed, there are several good reasons why, after almost one hundred years of stagnation, such a renaissance should take place at the present time. For while the philosophers were converting aesthetics into a subject with no conceivable interest for anyone with a drop of aesthetic sensibility, modern art and literature was giving birth to a series of extraordinary creations that raised momentous aesthetic issues. It was not the philosophers, however, but the critics (and these were often also the creators themselves) who grappled with these new and vital aesthetic problems. Benedetto Croce, the last great philosophical aesthetician, has rightly called men like Baudelaire, Flaubert, De Sanctis and Taine the best aestheticians of the last half of the nineteenth century; and in our own day, up until very recently, much the same situation prevailed. Anyone seeking enlightenment on twentieth-century artistic developments would go to Roger Fry, Clive Bell, T. S. Eliot, Ezra Pound and a whole host of other critics, rather than to any accredited philosophical reputation.

Philosophers were exclusively concerned with problems arising from the methodology of the physical sciences; and when art was not looked on as a superior form of amusement, it was relegated to the status of a decidedly inferior form of pseudo-scientific knowledge. Meanwhile, as the philosophers grew more disdainful, the claims of the art and literary critics grew more reckless and all-embracing; but the writings of the latter, for all their exaggerations, also contained valuable aesthetic insights. And in the last few years, writers like Suzanne Langer, André Malraux and Herbert Read have all attempted, with varying success, to use the experience of modern art for a renovation of aesthetic theory. The latest effort in this direction, and one of the richest and most stimulating, is the present book by Jacques Maritain.

M. Maritain, of course, is no stranger to aesthetic studies. His earlier work, *Art and Scholasticism,* is one of the most notable books of its kind to have appeared between the two wars, and it was followed by other volumes of sympathetic (if by no means uncritical) essays on modern art and literature. In *Art and Scholasticism,* M. Maritain performed the disconcerting feat of showing how an aesthetic derived from Thomas Aquinas and the Schoolmen could be used to justify the most advanced experiments of modern art, even if not all the products of modern art could be unconditionally accepted. For the Scholastics, according to M. Maritain, art was not the creation of any kind of illusion; it was the radiance of form shining through matter. And since, in the fine arts, there is no *a priori* fashion in which this resplendence of form must manifest itself, M. Maritain could easily defend, as far back as 1919, the transforming power of art that André Malraux has recently made the center of his impressive *Voices of Silence.*

M. Maritain's new book is a continuation and amplification of the ideas in *Art and Scholasticism,* deepened by all that has taken place in modern art and particularly in modern poetry during the last thirty years. In modern times, M. Maritain rightly points out, the arts have undergone what he calls a *prise de conscience,* a coming-to-consciousness of the process of their own activity. This process, he writes, "is essentially a process of liberation and enfranchisement, but liberation and enfranchisement of [the] intrinsic impulse, one with the nature of art, that requires it to *transform* the things it uses." Hand in hand with this *prise de conscience* has gone a revolt against discursive reason, in so far as the creative self has rejected any attempt to control its operations by accepted norms of any kind. Painters have become more and more free in their dealings with nature, using natural appearances entirely as an instrument of their creative purposes; poets have done the same with language, willfully disregarding syntax and discursive rationality.

Now the most important thesis of Maritain's book is that this revolt against reason, instead of being illegitimate and reprehensible, is rather the determined assertion by art of its proper dignity and function. Indeed, he argues that it is not really a revolt against reason at all—reason taken as a whole; it is a revolt only against a narrow and mistaken idea of reason that confuses its entire operation with logical cognition. The liberation of modern art, thus, is not "a process of liberation from reason itself, if it is true that reason possesses a life both deeper and less conscious than its articulate and logical life."

The most difficult and controversial part of M. Maritain's book is his effort to circumscribe the operation of this non-logical and non-conceptual reason, whose result is a work of art revealing "that intercommunication between the inner being of things and the inner being of the human self which is a kind of divination." (It is interesting to see here how M. Maritain's Thomism, by way of aesthetics, rejoins the attempts of a thinker like Heidegger to overcome the dualism of subject and object in tra-

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ditional ontology—a dualism resulting from the exclusive reign of discursive reason in the history of Western thought). Appealing to Aristotle's idea of a making or shaping intellect, as refined by Aquinas, M. Maritain defines an area in the psyche that he calls the spiritual unconscious or preconscious. This spiritual preconscious he distinguishes from the Freudian or animal unconscious, which is closed to the activity of the making intellect.

Even if one does not accept all the details of M. Maritain's cumbersome psychology, there is no doubt that the idea of a spiritual preconscious is a valuable acquisition to any description of aesthetic creativity. The activity of the artist is certainly linked to his feelings and desires rather than to his conscious reason; but the work of art, just as certainly, is more than the mere expression of these feelings and desires. It involves a spiritual activity, directed toward the work of art, that the Freudian theory has been totally unable to account for. No mechanistic conception of the psyche can do justice to aesthetic activity; and the usefulness of M. Maritain's idea is proven by a whole host of enlightening distinctions—such as that between the creative self and the self-centered ego—that help to clarify significant critical issues.

One of the most striking and important features of M. Maritain's book is his discussion of surrealism in relation to the spiritual experience of modern poetry. Surrealism has never had much influence in English-speaking countries, but it has played an important role in modern French literature; and as M. Maritain writes, surrealism "provides an outstanding opportunity to test any philosophy of poetic knowledge." For the surrealists tried to break with the nature of art, and to turn non-conceptual and non-logical poetic knowledge into absolute knowledge and into magic. "Art itself is no longer interested in the work as an end, the work becomes only a means of communicating knowledge, a kind of miraculous preaching."

To a greater or lesser extent, as M. Maritain himself indicates, this tendency, carried to an extreme by the surrealists, is latent in the whole symbolist tradition of modern poetry. And he criticizes it as a perversion of poetic knowledge, a betrayal of the creative self, which is—or should be—wholly focused on the work of art. This criticism raises the problem of the status of poetic knowledge in relation to other forms of the spirit; and it is questionable whether M. Maritain's emphasis on the productive activity leading to the work of art adequately settles the issue. For the problem is not located only in the subjective attitude of the artist; it arises primarily in relation to his finished work. Nonetheless, M. Maritain's pages on this crucial matter are among the most thoughtful and profound, so far as my knowledge goes, to have appeared in English so far.

*Creative Intuition,* in addition to these central ideas, also contains what is perhaps more important in the long run—a wealth of concrete perception on the most varied aesthetic problems. It is impossible to do more than mention M. Maritain's beautifully balanced chapter on abstract art, his discussion of the difference between classical and modern poetic imagery, and the gentle irony with which he chides the over-zealousness of modern critics who use Dante to denigrate modern poetry. Occasionally, one feels a strain between M. Maritain's Thomist principles and his aesthetic insight; it is odd to see him beginning with Aristotle and Aquinas and clinching a point by citing Coleridge or a German Romantic. But it is impossible not to admire the sensitivity of his response to modern art, and the tact with which he discriminates among its often bizarre manifestations—never impatient, never scornful, never rejecting anything *en bloc*, always on the alert for a core of spiritual integrity wherever it may be found. It is a rare pleasure to read a work characterized by this habit of mind and this quality of sensibility. And it is an additional and quite unexpected pleasure when such a work, starting from the unlikeliest premises, turns out to be the best attempt yet made to write a poetics of modern art.

# *Tolerance and Fear in a Spy-chasing Era*

## *by Ralph M. Goldman*

*Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties* by Samuel A. Stouffer (Doubleday; $4).

On August 5, 1948, Alger Hiss appeared before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, Representative Rankin demanded an investigation of Henry Wallace, and Senator Mundt declared that a Communist spy ring was operating in Washington "right now." To which President Truman responded that he believed this ring was in Mr. Mundt's mind and that these Congressional excursions against alleged Soviet spy rings were nothing more than a "red herring" designed by a Republican-controlled Congress to detract public attention from the Administration's program to curb inflation.

Within a few months — December, 1948 — Hiss was indicted and a year later convicted of perjury. On February 9, 1950, Senator Joseph McCarthy announced that he knew of 205 Communists in the State Department. The Gold-Rosenberg atomic spy cases were in full progress by the summer of 1950. By 1952 it was clearly demonstrated in many quarters that Henry Wallace had been the dupe of the Communists in 1948.

For five years the junior Senator from Wisconsin, Communists-in-government, and the suspect-thy-neighbor theme rubbed some people's nerves raw. For five years the press and other mass media lived in a condition-reflex state of excitation every time these subjects arose—that is, every day. The country seemed honeycombed with spies; Truman seemed derelict in his duty; the people seemed ridden by a national anxiety neurosis; the Republican Party seemed best qualified to save the nation from total subversion and said so.

In the history books the 1950-55 Spy Chase will be compared with the Alien and Sedition era of the 1790's, the Know-Nothing movement prior to the Civil War, the Klan during Reconstruction, and the Palmer raid orgy after World War I. The unique feature of the 1950-55 Spy Chase may prove to be that it was the best studied. Never before were the social sciences as technically prepared as they are today to do a job of objective examination. Never before

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was a wealthy private foundation as dedicated to man's study of his own behavior as is the Ford Foundation today. If self-examination and self-awareness are marks of the mature and civilized society, Ford's Fund for the Republic has helped deepen the mark by its $125,000 support of the Stouffer study of American attitudes toward the Communist threat and toward nonconformity in general. Professor Stouffer is Director of the Harvard University Laboratory of Social Relations.

In its conception, scope, and method the survey—a "probability" as distinguished from a "quota" sample—came up with some important firsts. It is the first time in the history of public opinion polling that two survey organizations—Gallup's American Institute of Public Opinion and the University of Chicago's National Opinion Research Center—independently handled the same questionnaire. The literature of social science will long refer to the close statistical agreement between the two sets of findings as proof positive of the reliability of opinion sampling.

Another unusual feature was the special study of "civic leaders." In addition to the 4,933 persons who made up the sample of the nation as a whole, 1,500 selected local leaders living in cities of 10,000 to 150,000 were also questioned. No attempt to select a "representative" group of local leaders would ever go undisputed, and so an arbitrary—yet defensible in terms of available research funds and objectivity of selection—list of 14 occupational roles was drawn up. It included mayors, presidents of local chambers of commerce, Community Chest chairmen, presidents of large labor union locals, Republican and Democratic county committee chairmen, commanders of the largest American Legion posts, regents of the DAR, presidents of local women's clubs, chairmen of the school boards and the library boards, presidents of the parent-teachers' associations, bar association presidents, and the publishers of the largest locally owned newspapers. The object was to discover how much civic leaders differed from rank-and-file America in their attitudes toward nonconformists, and how much they differed from each other.

The questionnaire also was unusual in that it used a great many "free-answer" questions as well as the usual "check-list" questions. This helped get at the breadth and depth of each person's attitudes. Furthermore, the same subjects were approached from different directions, separate questions providing an internal test of the validity of the questionnaire as a whole. Over 530 interviewers were used.

The survey was conducted during May, June, and July 1954, in part while the Army-McCarthy hearings were still in progress.

What of the Communist threat? Was it high among the things that worried most Americans in mid-1954? Hardly! Forty-three percent of the national cross-section were worrying about personal and family economic problems; 24 percent were worrying about health, personal or family; 30 percent were worrying about other types of personal problems; only 8 percent were concerned about world problems (including war); 6 percent about national and local problems. *Less than one percent* were worried about either the Communist threat or about civil liberties! As one respondent put it with poetic recognition of our specialized world: "I'm paying taxes for someone to do my worrying for me."

In fact, an important difference between the national cross-section and the civic leaders was in the fact that the latter were, as the poetic respondent expected, appreciably more worried about national, local, and world affairs. But even among community leaders the threat of Communism or the issue of civil liberties disturbed a mere *five percent.*

What of the threat of domestic Communists? About two-fifths of both the national cross-section and the civic leaders thought American Communists to be either a "very great" or a "great" danger. Another two-fifths viewed them as "some" danger.

What action against a domestic Communist would Americans approve? Seventy-seven percent would approve of taking away his American citizenship. Fifty-one percent would put him in jail. Sixty-four percent would allow the government to listen in on people's private phone conversations in order to get evidence against Communists. Seventy-three percent thought it a good idea for people to report to the FBI any neighbors or acquaintances whom they suspect of being Communists. Given a choice between two alternatives, 58 percent felt it more important to find out all the Communists even if some innocent people were hurt while only 32 percent thought it more important to protect the rights of innocent people.

The Communist threat is indeed quite remote from the personal life experience of most Americans, according to the survey findings. When asked how many Communists there were in the United States, answers ranged wildly from over a million to less than a thousand. Only three percent said they ever knew a person who admitted he was a Communist. An additional ten percent knew persons whom they suspected of Communist affiliation. Yet the national sample by two to one believed the less educated and working-class people more likely to be Communists than the better educated and white-collar people. No single ethnic or religious group was singled out as being predisposed toward Communism. Only nine percent thought Negroes were likely to become Communists; only five percent thought this of Jews.

Perhaps Dean Acheson, who would not "turn his back" on Hiss, will find some comfort in the responses to one question: "Suppose you discovered that one of your friends today had been a Communist ten years ago, although you are sure he is not now. Would you break your friendship with him, or not?" 89 percent of the community leaders replied "no" and 78 percent of the national cross-section agreed with them.

What should we do about dealing with Russia (the external threat)? 13 to 14 percent of both the national cross-section and the civic leaders would fight Russia; 17 percent would have nothing to do with Russia; 61 to 62 percent would talk over the problems. Interestingly enough, those who were most likey to see the *internal* threat as a "very great" or "great" danger also were more likely to see *external* difficulties, predicting an early World War III and recommending that we fight Russia.

Obviously the people have been more concerned about the *internal* threat of Communism. President Truman, preoccupied with the handling of the more serious *external* threat of Soviet might reaching out beyond the Iron Curtain, foolishly belittled those who articulated this popular feeling. In his long and proud career as a public representative, Truman never lost sight of his constituency as seriously as on this issue.

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The Stouffer study found that Republicans were only slightly more likely than Democrats—34 percent compared with 30 percent—to perceive the internal Communist threat as "relatively great." Asked "what is your opinion of these (congressional) committees investigating Communism," the Republican and Democratic rank-and-file again differed only slightly; 77 percent of the Republicans and 62 percent of the Democrats were either "very favorable" or "favorable" to the congressional spy-hunters. The difference of opinion among Republican and Democratic county chairmen was quite another thing; 68 percent of the Republican chairmen favored the investigating committees but only 39 percent of the Democratic chairmen held favorable views.

One of the biggest surprises of the study had to do with the congressional spy-hunters. Question Number 44 was: "Do you happen to know the names of any of the Senators or Congressmen who have been taking a leading part in these investigations of Communism? Who are they?" Fully 30 percent of the people could not come up with a single correct name—not even Senator McCarthy's. This is at the height of the Army-McCarthy hearings! (Of course it has long been established that even in the midst of a presidential campaign only about half the voters can name either vice-presidential nominee.)

This survey's examination of American reactions to the Communist conspiracy outside and inside the United States was only part of its scope. The Fund for the Republic was equally interested in learning who were the Americans who, in thwarting the conspiracy, would sacrifice some of the very liberties which the enemy would destroy.

The questions were designed to provide a "tolerance scale"—that is, the degree of willingness to tolerate nonconformists, such as Socialists, atheists, Communists, or people whose loyalty has been criticized. Should persons favoring government ownership of all railroads and big industries be allowed to make a speech in your community? Should atheists? Should admitted Communists? Should loyalty suspects who swear they are not Communists? Should each of these types have his books removed from the shelves of the public library? Be allowed to teach in a college?

The following figures reveal the pattern of American attitudes toward these nonconformists:

| | *The proportion of the national cross section who would* | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Allow a Speech | Oppose Book Removal | Allow College Teaching |
| By a Loyalty Suspect | 70% | 71% | 69% |
| Socialist | 58 | 52 | 33 |
| Atheist | 37 | 35 | 12 |
| Communist | 27 | 27 | 6 |

Americans would be more likely to respect the civil rights of a loyalty suspect who had sworn he was not a Communist than they would a Socialist, an atheist, or a Communist. Americans are more likely to tolerate a non-conformist's speech or book than have him teach in a college or university. Americans make a clearly special case of college teaching and practically rule out the right of atheists and Communists to instruct the nation's youth. More persons in the national cross-section were worried about Communists' converting other Americans than about possible espionage or sabotage. This in part explains the resistance to allowing Communists to become teachers.

What were the responses of the community leaders? The Stouffer study found that all 14 categories of community leaders tend on the average to be more respectful of the civil rights of those of whom they disapprove. The general pattern of responses was distributed in the same way as shown in the figures above for the national cross-section, except that the percentages for the community leaders ran about 19 points higher on the average. For example, 87 percent of the civic leaders would allow a loyalty suspect to make a speech whereas 70 percent of the national cross-section would grant the same right. Apparently community leaders are far more sensitive than the rank-and-file to the dangers involved in denying civil liberties to nonconformists. On the Stouffer "tolerance scale," 66 percent of the community leaders earned ratings of "more tolerant" and only 31 percent of the general national cross-section did as well.

Among the 1,500 community leaders, however, there were interesting variations. Commanders of the American Legion fell in greater numbers at the "less tolerant" end of the scale than most of the other community leaders. So did the regents of the DAR and the presidents of the women's clubs. The rank order of community leaders beginning at the more tolerant end of the scale was: newspaper publishers, Community Chest chairmen, library board presidents, bar association presidents, Republican county chairmen, PTA presidents, Chamber of Commerce presidents, Democratic county chairmen, labor union presidents, school board presidents, mayors (below average for the whole group), women's club presidents, DAR regents, and Legion commanders.

How did the characteristics of the more tolerant people differ from those who were less tolerant of nonconformists? Professor Stouffer's analysis was elaborate and stated in carefully qualified language, but the essence of the findings were as follows:

1. Younger people tend to be more tolerant than older people.
2. Younger civic leaders are more tolerant than their elders.
3. The more schooling a person has, the more likely that he is "relatively more tolerant."
4. Women tend to be less tolerant than men.
5. Regular church attenders tend to be less tolerant than non-church goers.
6. The regional distribution of "relatively more tolerant" people places the West at the head of the list, the East next, the Middle West next, and the South last.
7. The rural-urban distribution ranks the metropolitan areas as containing the most tolerant persons, followed by other cities, small towns, and farms, in that order.
8. Whites tend to be more tolerant than Negroes. Northern Negroes are more often in the "more tolerant" group than Southern Negroes.

THE Stouffer study will provide food for thought to students of politics for many years to come. The data presented in this volume have not been sliced in all the ways that they might. Already *Fortune* magazine has pulled out the figures that show that "among Americans, businessmen are an outstanding group in the degree to which they will tolerate individuals who do not conform to dominant community opinions."

For policy-makers probably the most important message of the survey is that

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schooling and mobility seem to be the strongest forces for broadening the degree of tolerance among the people. As Professor Stouffer puts it, to be tolerant, one must learn that people with different ideas are not necessarily bad people. The first step in learning this is to encounter the strange and the different. Schooling puts a person in touch with people whose ideas and values are different from his own. The increasing internal migration among American communities has a similar effect. At last there is scientific evidence to confirm our faith that school-builders and road-builders are key personnel for the preservation and growth of tolerance in our democracy.

Beyond the scope of the Stouffer study there remain unexplored two other related issues. First, how do we keep our press from going on conditioned-reflex binges in times of national anxiety when steady nerves and rational judgment are at a premium? Secondly, what new political weapons can we design to focus popular attention upon the long-haul struggle with the real adversary outside our borders?

# *She Loves Me, She Loves Me Not*

## *by Robert Parris*

ALBERTO MORAVIA now has seven novels to his credit, along with two plays and a few hundred articles and short stories. Those who have read *The Woman of Rome* will remember his penetrating psychological insight, and will readily grant the author a certain very real stature among modern story tellers. He does, however, have a one-track mind, and admits it. The thing that Moravia can write about, mostly, is women. He also writes about men, but I don't think he likes to very much. In *A Ghost at Noon*, at any rate, although he has a male tell the story in the first person, we wind up with a clearer picture of the lady involved; even though she is far more irresponsible than her husband, and totally dull, we like her better than we do him.

*A Ghost at Noon*, by Alberto Moravia (Farrar, Straus and Young; $3.50).

The argument of the book is as simple as you could wish for. Riccardo Molteni, a would-be poet and playwright, almost penniless, is offered a job as script writer by a movie producer, and consequently, a chance to make lots of money. He is highly deferential toward his new employer, and encourages his wife, Emilia, to be so too. Almost immediately she begins to lose her love for her husband, and then to despise him; he wonders why. To his repeated entreaties for an explanation, she offers evasions and shrugged shoulders. Meanwhile, Molteni meets up with Rheingold, a German film director who wants to collaborate with Molteni on a psychological interpretation of the Odyssey, in which Penelope greets her long-gone spouse with loyalty but no love. This is because he's so nice to all her suitors and doesn't kick them out the way she thinks he ought to. Molteni applies the lesson to his own problem, and comes up with the suspicion that Emilia may have thought that he wanted her to become the mistress of the producer of the film, in order to insure his future as a script-writer. We never really find out, though, what is eating the lady, and the most she offers her poor husband by way of explanation is that he isn't a "man," and that his character is no good. Then she gets killed in an automobile accident, which settles the question for good and all.

Inasmuch as the great part of the book is taken up with trying to induce in the reader some measure of sympathy for an inane situation, it is disappointing, not to say downright cowardly of Moravia not to let us in on the curious workings of Emilia's mind. Why, indeed, wasn't he a "man"? An analysis of the gradual changing of love into positive animadversion seems to be a more likely bet for a novel of this sort than the "What have I done to make her hate me?" theme. In any case, the game of "she loves me, she loves me not" is not one that adults should play in public (and what is more public than a novel?) and it does not appear that a discussion of the problems of adolescence is what the author had in mind.

In form then, the novel is not really successful. In the basic lines of its subject matter, its success depends largely on the patience and compassion of the reader. Its details, however, are expertly handled, and as in Moravia's other books, it's the psychological picture-painting and the intense realism of both scenic description and dialogue which are remarkable. The following passage will serve to illustrate the specific sort of introspection which makes up the body of the book:

> Children believe that tears have a decisive value as a form of sentimental persuasion; and so, in general, do women and persons of feeble and childish spirit. . . . Although I was weeping from genuine sorrow, I cherished some kind of hope that my tears would persuade Emilia not to leave me; and this illusion, if it comforted me a little, at the same time aroused in me a feeling almost of hypocrisy. It was just as if I were weeping on purpose, as if I intended to make use of my tears in order to blackmail Emilia. All at once I was ashamed; and, without waiting for Emilia's reply, I rose and left the room.

In spite of such precision, the style is disturbing, especially during the periodic violent episodes between the pair, because its keel is too even. This is no doubt another disadvantage of recounting a tale in the first person, but the narrative should always be geared to what is being narrated, or interest is bound to lag. Granted that the reader's imagination must create a tone of voice, an inflection, even so the author, or in this case, perhaps, the translator (Angus Davidson) has done little to meet the reader half-way.

With all these reservations, *A Ghost at Noon* is a valuable piece of work if only because its author knows exactly what he has to say, and has all the technique to say it clearly and simply. Whether or not "Why doesn't she love me?" is strong enough stuff to build a novel on, is another question.

### Notes on Contributors

JOSEPH FRANK teaches at Princeton University. RALPH M. GOLDMAN, a member of Brookings Institution in Washington, is presently engaged in research on the politics of the national party conventions. ROBERT PARRIS is a free lance writer. ROGER KENNEDY is a Washington commentator for NBC.

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# TELEVISION

I HAVE BEEN trying to find out what President Harding said on that occasion, on June 21, 1923, when the technicians thrust a gadget that looked like a cross-section of rotten orange in front of him as he was about to speak. But no portentous remark is recorded for posterity. The gadget, the President doubtlessly assumed, would never replace the megaphone that Rudy Vallee was just then beginning to employ.

On May 17, 1955, the gadget, greatly altered, brought two extra guests into the living rooms of millions of homes—the President of the United States and his Secretary of State. Instruments of its influence, both men were also masters of its technique. They never shouted, never rolled an "r" or smothered "m's" or "n's," and they very seldom looked, wall-eyed, at the cameras. They just talked earnestly to each other, and so to the rest of us. The convincing thing about their performance was that it didn't seem like a performance at all. Mr. Eisenhower had come a long way from the time that Batten, Barton, Durstine and Osborn sold him like a bowl of crispy, crunchy flakes on election eve. There were no hidden cue cards, no teleprompter, no rehearsals; the President himself accomplished the task which marks the "professional": he took himself and his Secretary of State "off" on time.

With this half hour Dwight Eisenhower takes his place near Franklin Roosevelt as an innovator in the art of political communication. Roosevelt inaugurated his "chat with a few neighbors at their fireside," establishing a new intimacy between the voter and his President, and thus he made old-style oratory anachronistic. Mr. Willkie, I'm told, never liked a microphone, and despite desperate efforts to acquaint him with its powers he still used it as Mr. Clarence Day, Sr., used the telephone. And while some would say that Mr. Dewey built a career upon a radio voice, the fact remains that FDR's opponents never could match the seeming ease and naturalness of the master.

With Mr. Truman there came also television, and with television the experts from Broadway and Hollywood with their grandiose productions and their elaborate effects. Truman was their first victim and in practicing upon him they nearly ruined a great natural "communicator" (as the word is at our network). They patted him with Max Factor No. 2, slicked his hair, dazzled him with arty lights "to bring out the lines of character in his face." It grew worse and worse until the President reclaimed his role as chief executive and threw the experts out.

With the coming of two new performers, Mr. Stevenson and Mr. Eisenhower, the process began again. The effort to make over Mr. Eisenhower was particularly aggressive and he was favored with much advice. The experts considered his voice and told him to bark less since he wasn't on the parade ground. They pinned him down in front of a teleprompter—a magnified script unrolling the lines on an illuminated scroll boxed over the camera. They instructed him with cue cards—the huge sheets of cardboard, held up to recall key phrases or ideas. They called on him to put on his glasses, or to take them off. The confusion mounted until an expert on experts, Mr. Robert Montgomery, appeared on the scene. Mr. Montgomery, like a symphony conductor, knows the work of each subsidiary specialist. His objective was to restore living-room, "fireside" intimacy. He began by eliminating the props which had buzzed and spun and confused a President more concerned with ideas than effects. Mr. Eisenhower in response came to bark less because his throat was less tense. He relaxed because he was encouraged to be himself.

**There were** temporary setbacks. The cabinet-making-extravaganza staged last October took the President back into the sound-studio atmosphere again. It was a political success, and yet the production was so stiff that we learned nothing about the kind of people who advise the President. These errors were avoided this time by Bob Doyle, a Washington director for NBC, who directed the May 17 discussion as the representative of the pooled resources of the television networks. He put the two earnest, decent men back into a small room, just across a coated glass screen from the viewer. He concentrated his cameras on the face of the President, as a visitor might concentrate his gaze. So he allowed the viewer to observe, and share, the President's responses to Mr. Dulles' report. The President's press secretary, Jim Hagerty, had long been encouraging such a "natural" approach. Before this broadcast Mr. Doyle made just one change in the "set": he asked the President to substitute a straight-backed chair for the deep swiveler usually behind his desk, in which Mr. Eisenhower would have bobbed in and out of "frame" like Kukla or Ollie.

Mr. Dulles appeared early in the afternoon. He informed Mr. Doyle that he would have no nonsense about fancy seating or calculated stares into the cameras. Getting his report properly into the lenses, he added, was Mr. Doyle's business. He reappeared shortly before broadcast time, and accepted the director's suggestion for placement of microphones and for the Secretary's two pages of typewritten notes. Those pages were the only "memory aids" used that night. The President responded naturally and directly to a report made (in that form) for the first time. The result, at least in technical terms, was a brilliant half hour, one which in scoring politically for the President and his party, also contributed to the larger task of drawing the nation into the decisions which must be made in foreign affairs. That this was the President's objective may have been indicated by his remark about the growing "maturity" of our people: their willingness to take some part of the responsibility for difficult decisions. As a lifelong soldier who suffered when the armed forces were made first to starve and then to feast, the President dislikes as much as Mr. Kennan and Mr. Lippmann the wild swings in public opinion about foreign policy. Perhaps the President believes further that these oscillations in attitude naturally follow oscillations in government attitude from secrecy to salesmanship: from a refusal to share information to sudden demands for hard sacrifices in the name of "vital" objectives which are none the less so unfamiliar that they must be "sold." The success of the May 17 experiment may encourage regular reports by Mr. Dulles. In turn this may help to create a public opinion ready to accept the continuing anxieties which have previously been almost exclusively restricted to Presidents and diplomats. That, I think, is what President Eisenhower meant by "maturity."

ROGER KENNEDY

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# CORRESPONDENCE

## ► Cairo to Capetown

SIRS:

Daniel Friedenberg's review of my book, *Cairo to Capetown* (*NR*, March 7), contains many statements of opinion which are not my present concern. The most that an author can ask of an editor, in these circumstances, is that he should be allowed to correct statements which are demonstrably false with regard to what he is alleged to have written.

I am first represented as having "travelled through Egypt with important letters of introduction to the high and mighty." As your review rightly comments, this would provide "the best source of misinformation," but as I carried no such "important letters" the comment is irrelevant. The most "high and mighty" person I met in Egypt was a member of the faculty at Fouad I University, to whom I needed no introduction.

My alleged "soupy optimism" with regard to Egypt and any alleged assumption "that a suppression of Christian imperialism will be replaced by a non-Christian or neo-Christian anti-imperialism" equally astonish me. In fact I devoted a good deal of space to Egyptian imperialism in the Sudan and made it clear that I was by no means confident that Egyptian aims here had fundamentally changed.

Most amazing of all, however, is Mr. Friedenberg's comment on my chapter heading, *Black Quakers and White Mau Mau*:

> The implication is that Negroes are Quakers and the Whites, in the shape of the Kenya Police Reserve, the "real" Mau Mau. This is intellectually dishonest.

As your reviewer stated elsewhere that I am "an obviously sincere man" (an apparent contradiction, surely?) I will not query his own intellectual honesty in reading a meaning into words for which there is no shadow of justification. Instead I will ask him and your readers to consider what is implied by that title. Had it read *Black Swans and White Elephants*, would he have leaped to an analogous conclusion? Would he have credited me with the suggestion that swans are black and that "real" elephants are white?

I did not suggest that Africans generally were Quakers any more than I suggested that Quakers generally were Africans. I wrote about black Quakers because I stayed awhile among them and considered them a subject of interest—nothing more or less—because Quakers are, in the main, an Anglo-American sect found among people of European origin. In other words, here was something of a novelty. For a similar reason I wrote of the "White Mau Mau" because much had been written about the original (black) Mau Mau, but I considered that not enough was known about white repression.

"Furthermore," says your reviewer, "it is simply not true to say there is no Mau Mau, or, at least to make the continued implication that a couple of poor Negroes raised their heads and the white man took this excuse to revert into a ravaging beast." Quite so—but I never said or implied anything of the sort. The sentence in that chapter which most closely sums up my impressions runs as follows: "But the veneer of civilization had been stripped from too many of the actors—white and black—in this human tragedy of the Kukuyu country." And I never criticized European liberals, as Mr. Friedenberg implies, for "objecting" to Mau Mau, but for failing to protest against the brutalities of the Kenya Police Reserve and others. It is also quite untrue to say that I "deplored counter-terrorism without condemning terrorism." I explicity deplored both, but tried—which seemed to me the most important thing—to understand and to explain their causes.

It is hard to understand how Mr. Friedenberg could represent me as "going from Christian mission to Chistian mission," which is certainly not *my* recollection either of the journey or of my book. And the suggestion that the optimism at the end of my journey had no factual basis completely ignores the stress which I placed on the growing importance of African labor in Central and South Africa and on the recent realization by a growing number of white employees in the South African Union that free white labor is imperilled by the enslavement of the Bantu.

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